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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present a proposal regarding the possible
stabilization of the rapid variations on the value of government bonds
issued by the States, using the “Game Theory”. In particular, we focus
our attention on three players: a large bank that has immediate access to
the market of government bonds (hereinafter called Speculator, our first
player), the European Central Bank (ECB, the second player) and the
State in economic difficulty (our third player). We propose on financial
transactions the introduction of a tax (cashed directly by the State in
economic difficulty), which hits only the speculative profits. We show
that the above tax would probably be able to avert the speculation, and,
even in case of speculation on its government bonds, the State manages to
pull itself out of the crisis. Finally, we also propose a cooperative solution
that enables all economic actors involved (the Speculator, the ECB and
the State) to obtain a profit.
JEL: C7,E4,G1,G2.
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1 Introduction
Lately, the global economic crisis is increased, affecting also States considered
very important in the economic field (as for example Italy). One of the causes
of the crisis is the exponential growth in government bonds yields, which has
increased the public debt of the States.
In the Fig.1 we can see that up to May 2011 the Italian 10-years and 3-years
government bonds offered a yield of approximately 4.80% and 3.15%, while in
December 2011 both rose above the 7.50% (see [14]).
Figure 1: Trend of Italian 10-years and 3-years government bonds
In the figure 2 we can see the trend upwards of Irish, Portuguese and Spanish
10-years government bonds from January 2010 to July 2011 (see the [15]).
Figure 2: Trend of Irish, Portuguese and Spanish 10-years government bonds
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In the figure 3 we can see the trend of main European States 10-years gov-
ernment bonds from June 2011 to January 2012 (see [16]).
Figure 3: Trend of main European 10-years government bonds
In this regard, with our paper, we intend to propose (using Game Theory
[for a complete study of a game see [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]])
a possible method to stabilize the government bonds market of the States in
economic difficulty, without any losses of collective gain. In this way, with the
introduction of a simple but effective tax, the market would be able by itself
to reduce yields on government bonds, without further economic measures at
global level: thus the States in financial difficulty could finally begin (hopefully)
a slow but steady economic recovery.
2 Methodologies
The normal-form game G, that we propose to model our financial interaction,
requires a construction which takes place on 3 times, which we say time 0, time
1/2 and time 1.
• At time 0 the Speculator (the first player) can decide
1) to sell short government bonds, in order to obtain greater profit betting
on a greater future yield of the bonds;
2) not to intervene in the government bonds market.
• At time 1/2 the ECB may decide to intervene in the bonds market in
order to limit the growth of the bonds yield. In this way, even in case of lack
of demand of government bonds, the issuer States finds the funds necessary to
the national financial requirement.
• At time 1 the Speculator must eventually close its position (opened at time
0) by buying government bonds.
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Remark. During the game, we will refer to an interest i which determines
the yield on government bonds. When we pass from one time period to another
one, we should actualize or capitalize the values that must be “transferred”. But
because the interest iu (used in the capitalization factor and discount factor)
is much lower than that one we use to get the yield of government bonds, we
assume iu equal to 0. Therefore, in this model, the values referred to different
time period are not capitalized or discounted.
3 Financial preliminaries
Here we recall the financial concepts that we shall use in the present article.
1. M represents the quantity expressed in money of issued bonds (for example
Italy has to issue a quantity equal to M of government bonds in order to
face its financial commitments).
2. Short selling of bonds is a financial transaction involving the sale of bonds
without having their property, hoping to buy them later at a lower price.
So the short seller would realize a profit. In the event that we examine,
talking about government bonds, the hope of short sellers consists in a
increase of the yield on government bonds.
3. The government bonds are not normal goods with a purchase price and a
sale price. The concept that characterizes them is the yield, which depends
upon the interest to which they are sold. The yield on a government bond
is given by the interest that remunerates the capital “loaned” to the State.
4 The description of the game
Our first player, the Speculator, may choose to sell short government bonds, in
order to cause an increase in the their yield and so to obtain a profit. In fact, at
time 1 the Speculator must close the position opened in the government bonds
market with a purchase transaction. Otherwise the Speculator can decide not
to intervene in the government bonds market.
Thus, the Speculator has the possibility to choose among the strategies x ∈
[0, 1] which represents the percentage of the quantity of government bonds M
that the Speculator decides to buy, depending it intends:
1. not to make any financial transaction (x = 0);
2. to sell short government bonds (xM is the quantity of short sold bonds)
(0 < x ≤ 1).
On the other hand, the European Central Bank, that is our second player,
operates in the bonds market in consequence of the operation of the first player.
It may choose a strategy y ∈ [0, 1], which represents the percentage of the
quantity of government bonds M that the ECB purchases, depending it intends:
1. to buy government bonds of the State in economic difficulty (y > 0);
2. not to intervene in the government bonds market (y = 0).
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In Fig.4 we illustrate graphically the bi-strategy space E × F of our game
G.
Figure 4: The bi-strategy space of the game
5 The no tax game
5.1 The payoff function of the Speculator in the no tax
game
The payoff function of the Speculator, which is the function that represents the
gain of the first player, is given by the quantity expressed in money of purchased
bonds xM , multiplied by the difference R1(x, y)−R0 between the value at time
1 of the yield to be cashed (at time 1 the Speculator buys the same amount of
securities that it has sold short at time 0) and the value at time 0 of the yield
to be paid (at time 0 the Speculator sells short a certain amount of government
bonds).
The payoff function of the Speculator is given by:
f1(x, y) = xM(R1(x, y)−R0), (1)
where:
1. xM is the amount of government bonds that the Speculator short sells at
time 0
2. R1(x, y) is the value of the government bonds yield at time 1. We suppose
it is given by
R1(x, y) = i+mx− ny,
where
• i is the interest that remunerates the capital “loaned” to the State;
• m is a marginal coefficient which indicates the incidence of x on
R1(x, y);
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• n is a marginal coefficient which indicates the incidence of y on
R1(x, y).
R1(x, y) depends on x because if the Speculator intervenes in the govern-
ment bonds market with a strategy x 6= 0, the yield R1(x, y) is modified
because a decline in demand has a positive effect on the interest charged
on the government bond. R1(x, y) depends on y because if the ECB in-
tervenes in the government bonds market with a strategy y 6= 0, the value
R1(x, y) is modified because an increase in demand has a negative effect
on the government bonds yield (the interest that remunerates the bond
goes down). We are assuming as a hypothesis both for x and y a linear
dependence.
3. R0 is the value of the yield at time 0. It is given by R0 = i, where i is the
interest that remunerates the capital that is “loaned” to the State. R0 is
a constant because on it does not have impact our strategies x and y.
The payoff function of the Speculator. Therefore, recalling the function
R1, the definition of R0 and the function f1, we have
f1(x, y) = xM(mx− ny). (2)
5.2 The payoff function of the ECB in the no tax game
The payoff function of the ECB, that is the function representing the algebraic
gain of the ECB, is given by the multiplication of the quantity expressed in
money of government bonds yM (that the ECB buys at time 1/2) by the bonds
yield at time 1/2, that is
R1/2(x) = i+mx.
So the payoff function of the ECB is given by:
f2(x, y) = yM(R1/2(x)), (3)
where
1. yM is the quantity of bonds expressed in money that the ECB buys at
time 1/2;
2. R1/2(x) is the bonds yield at time 1/2. It is given by:
R1/2(x) = i+mx.
On it has impact the strategy x because at time 0 the Speculator has
already operated in the market, changing the bonds yield.
The payoff function of the ECB. Recalling functions R1/2 and f2, we have
f2(x, y) = yM(i+mx). (4)
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5.3 The payoff functional relation of the State
In addition to the payoff functions of the Speculator and the ECB must also
be considered the payoff functional relation of the State. It is given by the
quantity M of issued government bonds, multiplied by the difference between
the yield R0 (which the State would pay without the intervention on the market
of the Speculator and of the ECB) and the yield R1 (which actually pays in
consequence of the strategies x of the Speculator and y of the ECB).
Payoff functional relation of the State. It is given by:
f3 = M(R0 −R1(x, y)). (5)
Recalling the definition of R0, the function R1, and the functional relation f3,
we have
f3(x, y) = M(−mx+ ny). (6)
The payoff function of the no tax game is so given, for every (x, y) ∈ E×F ,
by:
f(x, y) = (xM(mx− ny), yM(i+mx),M(−mx+ ny)) (7)
6 Study of the no tax game
6.1 Critical space of the no tax game
Since we are dealing with a non-linear game, it is necessary to study in the
bi-win space also the points of the critical zone that belong to the bi-strategy
space. In order to find the critical area of the game, we consider the Jacobian
matrix and we put its determinant equal 0.
About the gradients of f1 and f2, we have
∇f1(x, y) = (M(2mx− ny),−nxM)
∇f2(x, y) = (Mmy,M(i+mx)).
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is:
det Jf (x, y) = M
2(2mx− ny)(i+mx) +M2mxny.
Therefore, the critical space of the game is:
Zf = {(x, y) : M2(2mx− ny)(i+mx) +M2mxny = 0}.
Dividing by M2m, which are all positive numbers (strictly greater than 0), after
calculations finally we have: Zf = {(x, y) : y = 2mx(i−mx)(ni)−1}.
Assuming that m = 1/2, n = 1/2 and i = 1/4, we obtain
Zf = {(x, y) : y = (1/2)x2 + (1/4)x}.
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The critical area of our bi-strategy space is represented in the Fig.5 by the
segment [D,H].
Figure 5: The critical zone of the no tax game
6.2 Payoff space of the no tax game
In order to represent graphically the payoff space f(E × F ), we transform, by
the function f , all the sides of bi-strategy square E × F and the critical space
Z of the game G.
The segment [B,C] is the set of all the bi-strategies (x, y) such that x = 1
and y ∈ [0, 1].
Calculating the image of the generic point (1, y), we have: f(y, 1) = (M(m−
ny), yM(i+m)). Therefore, setting
X = M(m− ny) ∧ Y = yM(i+m),
and assuming M = 1, i = 1/4 and n = m = 1/2, we have
X = 1/2− (1/2)y and Y = (3/4)y.
Replacing Y instead of y in the first equation, we obtain the image of the
segment [B,C], defined as the set of the bi-wins (X,Y ) such that
X = 1/2− (1/2)(4/3)Y = 1/2− (2/3)Y ∧ Y ∈ [0, 3/4].
It is a line segment with extremes B′ = f(B) and C ′ = f(C).
Following the procedure described above for the other sides of the bi-strategy
square and for the critical space, that are the segments [A,B], [C,D], [D,A] and
[D,H], we obtain the Fig.6 on the payoff space f(E × F ) of our game G.
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Figure 6: The payoff space of the no tax game
We note that we get a sail-formed figure, but the results must now be inter-
preted according to the payoff functional relation of the issuer State. Recalling
the functional relation f3, and that M = 1 and n = m = 1/2, we note that:
• if the two players arrive on the points D′ and B′ the yield (that the issuer
State must pay for its government bonds) remains unchanged because it
is balanced by two equal opposing forces. This solution is undesirable
because it does not solve the problems of the State and not gives breath
to its economy;
• if the two players arrive on the side ]B′, C ′], the yield paid by the State for
its government bonds increases inexorably, bringing it closer to default;
• if the two players arrive in [A′, D′[, the yield paid by the State for its
government bonds decreases, and thus the State could emerge from the
crisis.
According to these considerations, is morally, ethically and economically desir-
able that the Speculator and the ECB arrive to the point A = (0, 1), so that the
paid yield goes down as more is possible and the State comes out of the crisis.
Remark. The point A′ and the point B′ have the same collective gain
about the three subjects of our game. In fact, if we arrive to point A′ the State
in economic difficulty has a profit equal to 1/2, the Speculator wins 0 and the
ECB wins 1/4. Instead if we arrive to point B′ the State has a profit equal to
0, the Speculator wins 0 and the ECB wins 3/4. In both points, the total gain
of the game is 3/4.
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7 Equilibria of the no tax game
7.1 Nash equilibria of the no tax game
If the two players decide to adopt a selfish behavior, they choose their own
strategy maximizing their partial gain. In this case, we should consider the
classic Nash best reply correspondences. The best reply correspondence of the
Speculator is the correspondence B1 : F → E given by y 7→ maxf1(·,y)E, where
maxf1(·,y)E is the set of all strategies in E which maximize the section f1(·, y).
Symmetrically, the best reply correspondence B2 : E → F of the ECB is
given by x 7→ maxf2(x,·) F .
Choosing M = 1, n = 1/2 and m = 1/2, which are always positive numbers
(strictly greater than 0), and recalling that f1(x, y) = xM(mx − ny), we have
∂1f1(x, y) = 2mxM − nyM . So we have:
B1(y) =
{ {1} if y < 1
{0, 1} if y = 1 .
Recalling also that f2(x, y) = yM(i + mx), we have ∂2f2(x, y) = M(i + mx)
and so:
B2(x) = {1} ∀ x ∈ E.
In the Fig.7 we have in red the inverse graph of B1, and in blue that one of
B2.
Figure 7: The Nash equilibria of the no tax game
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The set of Nash equilibria, that is the intersection of the two best reply
graphs (graph of B2 and the symmetric of B1), is Eq(B1,B2) = {(1, 1), (0, 1)}.
Analysis of Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibrium B = (1, 1) can be
considered very good for the two players, because they are on the proper maxi-
mal Pareto boundary. The selfishness, in this case, pays well.
But the Nash equilibrium B = (1, 1) does not solve the problems of the State
that issues the government bonds, because it should pay a yield that the strategy
x = 1 increases, and that is returned to its original level by the strategy y = 1.
In a word, the State continues to fund its public spending with a government
bonds yield too high for its possibilities. In the long term the State will end on
the brink of the abyss.
The Nash equilibrium A = (0, 1), instead, is good for the State, because the
yield to pay on government bonds goes downward. But the point A′ isn’t on
the maximal Pareto boundary.
Moreover, most likely, the Speculator will choose the strategy x = 1, because
the strategy x = 0 precludes the opportunity of profit for the Speculator, which
is stuck on the ordinate axis. With x = 1, instead, the Speculator tries to
win something depending on the strategy of the ECB, and still manages to not
lose. Basically, the most likely Nash equilibrium is the point B = (1, 1): almost
certainly the achievement of a Nash equilibrium would leave the issuer State in
trouble and at risk default.
Remark. At this point, the ECB could consider splitting the win 3/4
obtained in the most likely Nash equilibrium B with the issuer State, in order
to cancel the effects of the increase of the yield on government bonds. Thus, the
ECB would give 1/2 (value that the State loses because of a strategy x = 1) to
the State, taking for itself the sum of 1/4. But this seemingly simple solution
is not feasible for several reasons:
1. the ECB has a policy that usually does not interfere with that one of the
European States, therefore this kind of action is difficult to accomplish;
2. the ”payback” to the State by the ECB could have very long timescales,
and therefore the State could sink even deeper into economic crisis.
3. the amount cashed by the State cancels its loss (suffered because of the
strategy of Speculator), but it would simply postpone the problem over
time without dealing with it. In fact, if in the future other financial
institutions buy government bonds, the State should pay them a yield
which is remained at unsustainable levels, ending in bankruptcy (it is
impossible to think that the ECB intervenes each time to save the State,
giving him the major part of its profit)
For these reasons, it is important to find a method that allows the State to
prevent speculation and not to be constantly “cured”. Anyway, it is obvious
that a vaccine made only once, is better than a medicine taken continuously,
medicine which in future will lose its effectiveness.
Note. We can note that there are three possible cases:
1. If m = n we have the case that we are studying.
2. If m > n we have: B1(y) = {1} ∀ y ∈ F .
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3. If m < n we have: B1(y) =

{1} if y < m/n
{0, 1} if y = m/n
{0} if m/n < y ≤ 1
.
In order that our model achieves the aims which will be explained further on, is
necessary that the marginal incidence m of the strategy x on R1 isn’t lower than the
marginal incidence n of the strategy y on R1 (in fact in this case the point A = (0, 1)
is already the only Nash equilibrium).
But very likely, the value n is lower than the value m because the purchase of
government bonds by the ECB could be less accepted by the market players. In fact,
the action of the ECB could be seen as a behavior dictated (also, or even only) by
political motivations, and not by economic reasons (like for example low risk and high
profit about government bonds).
7.2 Defensive phase of the no tax game
We suppose that the two players are aware of the will of the other one to destroy
it economically, or are by their nature cautious, fearful, paranoid, pessimistic
or risk averse, and then they choose the strategy that allows them to minimize
their loss. In this case, we talk about defensive strategies.
Conservative value and meetings. Conservative value of a player. It is
defined as the maximization of its function of worst win.
Therefore, the conservative value of the Speculator is v]1 = supx∈E f
]
1(x),
where f ]1 is the function of worst win of the Speculator, and it is given by
f ]1(x) = infy∈F f1(x, y), for every x in E.
Choosing M = 1, n = 0.5 and m = 0.5, which are always positive numbers
(strictly greater than 0), and recalling that f1(x, y) = xM(mx− ny), we have:
f ]1(x) = infy∈F xM(mx− ny).
Since the offensive strategies of the ECB are
O2(x) =
{ {1} if x > 0
{F} if x = 0 ,
we obtain:
f ]1(x) =
{ {xM(mx− n)} if x > 0
{0} if x = 0 .
In Fig.8 appears f ]1 graphically.
Figure 8: The function of worst win of the Speculator in the no tax game
So the defense (or conservative) strategy set of the Speculator is E] = {0, 1}
and the conservative value of the Speculator is
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v]1 = sup
x∈E
inf
y∈F
xM(mx− ny) = 0. (8)
On the other hand, the conservative value of the ECB is given by v]2 =
supy∈F f
]
2, where f
]
2 is the function of the worst win of the ECB. It is given by
f ]2(y) = infx∈E f2(x, y), for every y ∈ F .
Choosing M = 1, i = 0.25 and m = 0.5, which are always positive numbers
(strictly greater than 0), and recalling that f2(x, y) = yM(i + mx), we have:
f ]2(y) = infx∈E yM(i+mx).
Since the offensive strategies of the Speculator are
O1(y) =
{ {0} if y > 0
{E} if y = 0 ,
we obtain:
f ]2(y) =
{ {yMi} if y > 0
{0} if y = 0 .
In Fig.9 appears f ]2 graphically.
Figure 9: The function of worst win of the ECB in the no tax game
So the defense (or conservative) strategy set of the ECB is given by F ] = {1}
and the conservative value of the ECB is
v]2 = sup
y∈F
inf
x∈E
yM(i+mx) = Mi. (9)
Therefore, recalling that M = 1 and i = 0.25, the conservative bi-value is
v]f = (v
]
1, v
]
2) = (0, 1/4).
Conservative meetings. They are represented by the bi-strategies (x], y]),
that are represented by the values B = (1, 1) and A = (0, 1).
The conservative meeting B = (1, 1) can be considered good for the Spec-
ulator and the ECB, because it is on the maximal Pareto boundary, but it is
mediocre for the State. In fact, recalling that f3(x, y) = M(−ny + mx), the
yield to pay on government bonds goes down by 1/2, in accordance with the
strategy y = 1 of the ECB, but it re-increases by the same amount because of
the strategy x = 1 of the Speculator.
The conservative meeting A = (0, 1), instead, is good for the State, because
the yield to pay on government bonds goes downward. But the point A′ isn’t
on the maximal Pareto boundary.
13
Moreover, most likely, the Speculator will choose the strategy x = 1, because
the strategy x = 0 precludes the opportunity for profit for the Speculator, which
is stuck on the ordinate axis. With x = 1, instead, the Speculator tries to win
something depending on the strategy of the ECB, and still manages to not lose.
Basically, the most likely conservative meeting is B = (1, 1): almost certainly
the achievement of a conservative meeting would leave the issuer State in trouble
and at risk default.
Note. Recalling that f ]1(x) =
{ {xM(mx− n)} if x > 0
{0} if x = 0 , we can note that
there are three possible cases:
1. If m = n we have the case that we are studying.
2. If m > n we have: x] = 1.
3. If m < n we have: x] = 0.
In order that our model achieves the aims which will be explained further on, is
necessary that the marginal incidence m of the strategy x on R1 isn’t lower than the
marginal incidence n of the strategy y on R1 (in fact in this case the point A = (0, 1) is
already the only defensive equilibrium). But very likely, the value n is lower than the
value m because the purchase of government bonds by the ECB could be less accepted
by the market players. In fact, the action of the ECB could be seen as a behavior
dictated (also, or even only) by political motivations, and not by economic reasons
(like for example low risk and high profit about government bonds).
7.3 Cooperative solutions of the no tax game
The best way for the two players to get both a win without causing the default
of the State in economic difficulty, is to find a cooperative solution.
Cooperative solution. The Speculator and the ECB play the strategies
x = 0 and y = 1 in order to arrive at the payoff A′ (which allows the State to
reduce the yield on its government bonds) and then they split the bi-win A′ by
means of a contract.
The Speculator benefits by cooperating with the ECB because following the
Nash strategy it does not win anything (while in this way wins 1/10); the ECB
is able to save the State in difficulty, but gives up a significant part of its win
than the Nash equilibrium.
Practically: the Speculator does not act with any speculative movement on
the securities market, and the ECB, that manages to save the State in economic
crisis, shares with the Speculator its winning W = 1/4, obtained arriving to A′.
For a possible quantitative division of this win W = 1/4, between the ECB
and the Speculator, we use the transferable utility solution, applying to the
transferable utility Pareto boundary of the payoff space a non-standard Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution.
Remark. We consider the infimum and the supremum of the maximal
Pareto boundary for a better view of the game in its entirety.
We proceed finding the supremum of our maximal Pareto boundary, which
is sup ∂∗f(E × F ) =: α = (1/2, 3/4); then we join it with the infimum of our
maximal Pareto boundary, which is given by inf ∂∗f(E × F ) = (0, 0).
The coordinates of the intersection of the point P , between the straight line
of collective win (i.e. X + Y = 1/4) and the straight line joining the supremum
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of the maximal Pareto boundary with the infimum (i.e. the line Y = (3/2)X),
give us the desirable division of the collective win W = 1/4 between the two
players.
In order to find the coordinates of the point P is enough to put in a system
of equations X + Y = 1/4 and Y = (3/2)X. Substituting the Y in the first
equation we have X + (3/2)X = 1/4 and therefore X = 1/10.
Substituting now the X in the second equation, we have Y = 3/20. Thus
P = (1/10, 3/20) suggests as solution that the Speculator receives 1/10 by
contract by the ECB, while at the ECB remains the win 3/20.
We can see the Fig.10 in order to make us more aware of the situation.
Figure 10: A possible cooperative solution of the no tax game
Remark. But the cooperative solution leaves us dissatisfied. In fact the
cooperative solution is difficult to implement because the ECB should achieve
an agreement with the Speculator before that the Speculator plays a strategy
x > 0, and is almost impossible to know in advance the intentions of all the
potential speculators in the bonds market. For this reason, it is necessary a
preventive economic measure.
8 A new anti-speculative proposal
In the paper [11] we propose, in order to avoid speculations of the first player
about the current and future yield of the government bonds, to introduce by
regulatory authorities a tax that affects the gain obtained through speculative
trades involving the government bonds . We hypothesized that the tax increased
the reserves of the ECB.
We obtained the payoff space in figure 11.
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Figure 11: The payoff space of the game with tax cashed by the ECB
Moreover, we noted the movement from point B to point A of the Nash and
defensive equilibria. The point A is an optimal point for the State in economic
difficulty, because the yield on its government bonds decreases, and at the same
time is a quite good point for the Speculator and the ECB because they are on
the weak maximal Pareto boundary.
The new anti-speculative proposal. We propose that the tax is not
cashed by ECB, but directly by the State in economic difficulty. In this way,
even if the Speculator intervenue in government bonds market with a strategy
x 6= 0, the State cancels whole or in part the effect upwards of the strategy x
on government bonds yield.
8.1 The new payoff of the Speculator
We assume that the tax eliminates completely the possibility of speculative
profits created by the Speculator itself: the tax is equal to the incidence mx of
the strategy x on the yield R1.
With the introduction of the tax, recalling the Eq. (2), that is f1(x, y) =
xM(R1(x, y)−R0), the payoff function of the Speculator becomes:
f1(x, y) = xM(R1(x, y)− T (x)−R0).
We assume that T (x) = mx. After the calculations, we obtain:
f1(x, y) = xM(−ny) (10)
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8.2 The new payoff function of the ECB
We assume that the introduction of the tax has no effect on the payoff function of
the ECB. So its payoff function is equal to Eq. (4), that is f2(x, y) = yM(i+mx).
8.3 The new payoff function of the State
IIn the case of adoption of the tax, the payoff function of the State without tax
is added to the total tax paid by the Speculator. The total tax paid by the
Speculator is given by the amount of government bonds xM purchased by the
Speculator, multiplied by the tax T (x) applied.
In mathematical language, the payoff function of the State with the tax is
given by
f3 = M(R0 −R1) + xMT (x). (11)
Recalling that R0 = i, that R1(x, y) = i+mx− ny, assuming that T (x) = mx,
and replacing them in the Eq. (11), that is f3(x, y) = M(R0 −R1) + xMT (x),
we have
f3(x, y) = M(i− (i+mx− ny)) + xMmx.
After the calculations, we have
f3(x, y) = M(−mx+ ny) + xMmx. (12)
The payoff function of the game with tax cashed by the State is
f(x, y) = (xM(−ny), yM(i+mx),M(−mx+ ny) + xMmx)
9 Study of the game with tax cashed by the
State
9.1 Critical space of the new game
Since we are dealing with a non-linear game, it is necessary to study in the
bi-win space also the points of the critical zone that belong to the bi-strategy
space. In order to find the critical area of the game, we consider the Jacobian
matrix and we put its determinant equal 0.
About the gradients of f1 and f2, we have
grad f1 = (−Mny),−nxM)
grad f2 = (Mmy,M(i+mx).
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is
det Jf(x,y) = −M2ny(i+mx) +M2nxmy.
Therefore, the critical space of the game is
Zf = {(x, y) : −M2ny(i+mx) +M2nxmy = 0}.
Dividing by M2n, which are all positive numbers (strictly greater than 0), we
have:
Zf = {(x, y) : xmy − y(i+mx) = 0}.
Finally, after the calculations, we have Zf = {(x, y) : y = 0}.
The critical area of our bi-strategy space is represented in the figure 12 by
the segment [D,C].
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Figure 12: The critical zone of the game with tax cashed by the State
9.2 New payoff space of the game
In order to represent graphically the payoff space f(E × F ), we transform, by
the function f , all the sides of bi-strategy square E × F and the critical space
Z of the game G.
We obtain, on the payoff space f(E × F ) of our game G, the figure 13:
Figure 13: The payoff space of the game with tax cashed by the State
Remark. Now the results must be interpreted according to the payoff func-
tion of the issuer State. Recalling the Eq. (12), that is
f3(x, y) = M(−mx+ ny)) + xMmx,
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and that M = 1 and n = m = 1/2 we note that
• if the two players arrive to the points D′ the yield that the issuer State has
to pay for its securities remains unchanged. This solution is undesirable
because it does not solve the problems of the State and does not gives
breath to its economy.
• if the two players arrive to the points C ′ the yield (that the issuer State
has to pay on its government bonds) increases, but the tax cashed balances
the increase of the yield. This solution is undesirable because it does not
solve the problems of the State, leaving the yield unchanged.
• if the two players arrive to the point A′ the yield paid by the State for its
government bonds decreases, and thus the State emerges from the crisis.
• if the two players arrive to the point B′ the yield paid by the State for its
government bonds remains unchanged, but the State cashes the Tax on
the government bonds speculation by the Speculator, and thus the State
emerges from the crisis.
• if the two players arrive to the side ]B′A′[ the yield paid by the State for
its government bonds decreases in a lower extent than the point A′, and
the tax cashed cancels only partially the effect of the strategy x of the
Speculator.
According to these considerations, is morally, ethically and economically de-
sirable that the Speculator and the ECB arrive to the points A = (0, 1) or
B = (1, 1).
Remark. Comparing the payoff space of the no tax game (see the figure 6)
and that one of the game with the tax cashed by the State (see the figure 13),
we note that the latter seems smaller. At first glance, it seems that the tax has
caused a loss of global wealth. But is not so: in fact the collective profit of the
three players remains unchanged. The big difference is that the Speculator is
effectively unable to make a profit, and the “lost” due to the tax increases the
win of the State.
Remark. The point A′ and the point B′ have the same collective gain
about the three subjects of our game. In fact, if we arrive to point A′ the State
in economic difficulty has a profit equal to 1/2, the Speculator wins 0 and the
ECB wins 1/4. Instead if we arrive to point B′ the State has a profit equal to
1/2, the Speculator loses 1/2 and the ECB wins 3/4. In both points, the total
gain of the game is 3/4 (which is the same of the point A′ and B′ of the no tax
game).
10 Equilibria of the game with tax cashed by
the State
10.1 New Nash equilibria of the game
If the two players decide to adopt a selfish behavior, they choose their own
strategy maximizing their partial gain. In this case, we should consider the
classic Nash best reply correspondences. The best reply correspondence of the
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Speculator is the correspondence B1 : F → E given by y 7→ maxf1(·,y)E, where
maxf1(·,y)E is the set of all strategies in E which maximize the section f1(·, y).
Symmetrically, the best reply correspondence B2 : E → F of the ECB is
given by x 7→ maxf2(x,·) F .
Choosing M = 1, n = 1/2 and m = 1/2, which are always positive numbers
(strictly greater than 0), and recalling the Eq. (10), that is f1(x, y) = xM(−ny),
we have
∂1f1(x, y) = −Mny.
This derivative is positive if −nyM > 0, and so:
B1(y) =
{ {0} if y > 0
{E} if y = 0 .
Recalling also the Eq. (4), that is f2(x, y) = yM(i+mx), we have
∂2f2(x, y) = M(i+mx).
This derivative is positive if M(i+mx) > 0, and so:
B2(x) = {1} ∀ x ∈ E
In Fig.14 we have in red the inverse graph of B1, and in blue that one of B2.
Figure 14: The Nash equilibria of the game with tax cashed by the State
The set of Nash equilibria, that is the intersection of the two best reply
graphs, is
Eq(B1,B2) = (0, 1).
Analysis of Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibria can be considered
optimal for the two players, because they are on the proper maximal Pareto
boundary. The selfishness, in this case, pays very well.
The Nash equilibria of the game with tax, moreover, is great for the State
that issues the government bonds, because the yield (that the State has to pay)
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goes downward because of the strategy y = 1, while the strategy x = 0 does not
affect upward. In a word, the State finances its public spending with a lower
government bonds yield, and this allows it to overcome the economic crisis that
has invested it.
10.2 New defensive phase of the game
We suppose that the two players are aware of the will of the other one to destroy
it economically, or are by their nature cautious, fearful, paranoid, pessimistic
or risk averse, and then they choose the strategy that allows them to minimize
their loss. In this case, we talk about defensive strategies.
10.2.1 Conservative value and meetings.
Conservative value and meetings. Conservative value of a player. It is
defined as the maximization of its function of worst win. Therefore, the conser-
vative value of the Speculator is v]1 = sup(x∈E) f
]
1, where f
]
1 is the function of
worst win of the Speculator, and it is given by f ]1(x) = inf(y∈F ) f1(x, y).
Recalling the Eq. (10), that is f1(x, y) = xM(−ny), and choosing M = 1
and n = 0.5, which are always positive numbers strictly greater than 0, we have:
f ]1 = inf
y∈F
xM(−ny).
Since the offensive strategies of the ECB are O2(x) =
{ {1} if x > 0
{F} if x = 0 , we
obtain:
f ]1(x) =
{ {xM(−n)} if x > 0
{0} if x = 0 .
Graphically f ]1 appears as:
Figure 15: The function of worst win of the Speculator in the game with tax
cashed by the State
So the defense (or conservative) strategy of the Speculator is given by x] = 0,
and the conservative value of the Speculator is
v]1 = sup
x∈E
inf
y∈F
xM(−ny) = 0. (13)
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On the other hand, the conservative value of the ECB is given by v]2 = supy∈F f
]
2,
where f ]2 is the function of the worst win of the ECB. It is given by f
]
2(y) =
infx∈E f2(x, y).
Recalling the Eq. (4), that is f2(x, y) = yM(i+mx), and choosing M = 1,
i = 0.25 and m = 0.5, which are always positive numbers (strictly greater than
0), we have:
f ]2 = inf
x∈E
yM(i+mx).
Since the offensive strategies of the Speculator are O1(y) =
{ {0} if y > 0
{E} if y = 0 ,
we obtain:
f ]2(y) =
{ {yMi} if y > 0
{0} if y = 0 .
Graphically f ]2(y) appears as:
Figure 16: The function of worst win of the ECB in the game with tax cashed
by the State
So the defense (or conservative) strategy of the ECB is given by y] = 1, and
the conservative value of the ECB is
v]2 = sup
y∈F
inf
x∈E
yM(i+mx) + xMmx = Mi. (14)
Therefore, choosing M = 1 and i = 0.25, the conservative bi-value is
v]f = (v
]
1, v
]
2) = (0, 1/4).
Conservative meetings. They are represented by the bi-strategies (x], y]),
that are represented by the value A = (0, 1).
Analysis of conservative meeting. The conservative meeting can be
considered good because it is located on the proper maximal Pareto boundary,
and it is also great for the State. In fact, recalling the Eq. (11), that is
f3(x, y) = M(ny −mx) + xMmx,
and that M = 1 and n = m = 0.5 are always positive numbers (strictly greater
than 0), the yield paid on government bonds falls by 1/2, because of the strategy
x = 0 of the Speculator and the strategy y = 1 of the ECB.
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11 Cooperative solution of the new game
We assumed that on the bonds yield the incidence n of y is equal to the incidence
m of x. But if we assume that n < m, our payoff space changes. Remark. Very
likely, the value n is lower than the value m because the purchase of government
bonds by the ECB could be less accepted by the market players. In fact, the
action of the ECB could be seen as a behavior dictated (also, or even only) by
political motivations, and not by economic reasons (like for example low risk
and high profit about government bonds).
So, for the cooperative solution we assume that n = 1/3 and m = 1/2. In
the figure 17 we can see the new payoff space.
Figure 17: The payoff space of the game with n < m
We note that the point B′ moves upward.
Cooperative solution. The Speculator and the ECB play the strategies
x = 1 and y = 1 in order to arrive at the point B′, which allows the State to
win the value 1/3 (in fact, the increase of the bond yield is totally balanced by
the tax cashed). After, the ECB divides its win 5/12 with the Speculator by
contract.
Financial point of view. The Speculator plays the strategy x = 1, and
the ECB shares with the Speculator its winning W = 5/12, obtained arriving
to B′. At the same time, the State in economic difficulty is saved.
For a possible quantitative division of this win W = 5/12, between the ECB
and the Speculator, we use the transferable utility solution, applying to the
transferable utility Pareto boundary of the payoff space a non-standard Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution.
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We proceed finding the infimum of our maximal Pareto boundary, which is
inf ∂∗f(E × F ) =: β = (−1/3, 0); then we join it with the Nash equilibrium of
the game, which is given by A′ = (0, 1/4).
We can see the figure 18 in order to make us more aware of the situation.
Figure 18: The cooperative solution of the game with n < m
The coordinates of the intersection of the point P , between the straight
line of collective win (i.e. X + Y = 5/12) and the straight line joininig the
infimum of the maximal Pareto boundary with the Nash equilibrium (i.e. the
line Y = (3/4)X + 1/4), give us the desirable division of the collective win
W = 5/12 between the two players.
In order to find the coordinates of the point P is enough to put in a system
of equations X + Y = 5/12 and Y = (3/4)X + 1/4. Substituting the Y in the
first equation we have X + (3/4)X = 1/6 and therefore X = 2/21. Substituting
now the X in the second equation, we have Y = 9/28.
Thus P = (2/21, 9/28) suggests as solution that the Speculator receives 2/21
by contract by the ECB, while at the ECB remains the win 9/28.
12 Conclusions
We just studied two games with the same agents: the first game is a simplified
representation of the reality; in the second one we suggest a possible regulatory
model that provides the stabilization of the government bonds market through
the introduction of a tax on government bonds transactions.
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No tax game. Without the introduction of the tax, the defensive and
Nash equilibria lead most likely in the point B. But the point B is not a
good point of arrival for the State in economic difficulty, because the yield
on its bonds remains at high levels and unchanged. In this regard, the only
possible satisfactory solution is a cooperative solution between the two players:
the Speculator and the ECB play the strategies x = 0 and y = 1 arriving to
point A′ and dividing the collective win by contract (at the same time, the
yield on government bonds of the State decreases, and so the total gain of the
three subjects of our game is the same than that one in the point B′). But
the cooperative solution leaves us dissatisfied. In fact the cooperative solution
is difficult to implement because the ECB should achieve an agreement with
the Speculator before that the Speculator plays a strategy x > 0, and is almost
impossible to know in advance the intentions of all the potential speculators
in the bonds market. For this reason, it is necessary a preventive economic
measure.
Game with the tax cashed by ECB. In the regulatory model that we
proposed in [11] with the introduction of the tax cashed bye the ECB, we note
that the Nash and defensive equilibria of the game move to point A. The
point A is an optimal point for the State in economic difficulty, because the
yield on its bonds is reduced, allowing the State to move the first step towards
economic recovery. But in this case, the point A′ is also a quite good point
for the Speculator and the ECB, because they are on the weak maximal Pareto
boundary: we transformed the politically more desirable solution in a solution
convenient for all parties involved. In this way, the collective gain is not subject
to losses than the no tax game, and once and for all we solve the problem of
too high yield on government bonds. Moreover, the introduction of the tax is a
preventive deterrent for the presence of the speculators in the bonds market.
Game with the tax cashed by State. In this case, the results achieved
with the introduction of the tax cashed by the ECB remain valid. Moreover,
we make a further step forward. The point A′ becomes a point of the proper
maximal Pareto boundary (in the game between the Speculator and the ECB),
and not only a point of the weak maximal Pareto boundary. Moreover, also the
point B′ becomes an optimal point for the State (the profit of the State is the
same of that one in the point A′: in fact, even if the Speculator for any reason
decides to play the strategy x = 1, the tax cashed directly by the State balances
the increase in the yield on its government bonds and so the State wins 1/2
equally.
Thanks to this result (and assuming a higher incidence on government bonds
yield of actions by the Speculator than these one by ECB), we can propose also
a cooperative solution between the Speculator and the ECB. They divide the
win W = 5/12 of the point B′ by contract (the Speculator wins 2/21, the BCE
wins 9/28 and at the same time the State in economic difficulty wins 1/3). In
this way, all three economic subjects of our game win something: the Speculator
and the ECB win more than Nash and defensive equilibria, and the State goes
out of the economic crisis.
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